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Nonlinear dynamicsAbstract This study explores the conceptual history of systems biology and its impact on philosoph-
ical and scientific conceptions of reductionism, antireductionism and emergence. Development of
systems biology at the beginning of 21st century transformed biological science. Systems biology
is a new holistic approach or strategy how to research biological organisms, developed through three
phases. The first phase was completed when molecular biology transformed into systems molecular
biology. Prior to the second phase, convergence between applied general systems theory and
nonlinear dynamics took place, hence allowing the formation of systems mathematical biology.
The second phase happened when systems molecular biology and systems mathematical biology,
together, were applied for analysis of biological data. Finally, after successful application in science,
medicine and biotechnology, the process of the formation of modern systems biology was completed.
Systems and molecular reductionist views on organisms were completely opposed to each other.
Implications of systems and molecular biology on reductionist–antireductionist debate were quite
different. The analysis of reductionism, antireductionism and emergence issues, in the era of systems
biology, revealed the hierarchy between methodological, epistemological and ontological antireduc-
tionism. Primarily, methodological antireductionism followed from the systems biology. Only after,
epistemological and ontological antireductionism could be supported.
ª 2015 The Author. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of King Saud University. This is an
open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Systems biology is a strategy or a way of thinking how to
investigate biological organism. Systems biology studies the
organisms as integrated systems composed of dynamic andinterrelated genetic, protein, metabolic and cellular compo-
nents with the help of biology, mathematics, technology and
computer science (Auffray et al., 2003; Friboulet and
Thomas, 2005; Bruggeman and Westerhoff, 2006). O’Malley
and Dupre´ (2005) classified systems biology on pragmatic sys-
tems biology, whose emphasis is on the analysis of molecular
interactions at the general level and system–theoretical biology
which considers the systemic principles. Both parts of systems
biology insist on mathematical modeling (O’Malley and
Dupre´, 2005).
When and how does systems biology emerged? According
to Westerhoff and Palsson (2004) systems biology has two his-
torical roots. The first and the most frequently mentioned root,
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genetic material, as well as on the methods of gene manipula-
tion. Second root is related to the thermodynamic aspects of
living organisms introduced in biology during the 40s of the
20th century.
This article discusses three phases of systems biology devel-
opment. First phase included the transformation of molecular
biology into systems molecular biology. This phase referred to
the discovery of the structure and function of genes and genetic
engineering (Westerhoff and Palsson, 2004). Since 1953,
molecular biologists discovered the structure and function of
genes and finally, at the beginning of 21st century, deciphered
human genome. In postgenomic era, the goal of molecular
biology has changed. The search for explanation how complex
molecular pathways and networks supported biological struc-
ture and function has become a central issue of molecular biol-
ogy. Shifting from single molecule to molecular network
approach definitely marked the emergence of systems molecu-
lar biology. The second phase, the development of systems-
mathematical biology, referred to the general systems theory
(GSS) and nonlinear dynamics of living organisms. Third
phase, followed after the convergence of molecular systems
biology and systems mathematical biology, relates to the devel-
opment of systems based medicine, biotechnology and drug
discovery.
Systems biology influenced the longstanding reductionism–
antireductionism debate. Systems biology view on biology, as
being holistic and integrative, was quite opposed to molecular
reductionist position (Strange, 2005; Ahn et al., 2006).
Reductionists claimed that every biological phenomenon could
be explained in terms of molecular biology and ultimately phy-
sics. The physics is supposed to be only fundamental science of
natural world. Hence, theories and laws of other natural
sciences should be explainable by fundamental theories and
laws of physics. All sciences should be a part of one unified
science. In the 20th century, supporters of the unity of science
used theory reduction for the unification project (Bechtel and
Hamilton, 2007). Systems biology changed the way we think
about the concept of emergence. As being the most important
concept discussed in reductionism–antireductionism debate, it
deserves necessary reexamination in the light of modern
systems biology.
This article deals with conceptual history of systems biol-
ogy and its impact on important scientific and philosophical
issues. First I will argue that systems mathematical biology
has two historical roots, general systems theory and nonlinear
dynamics. Their convergence leads to modern systems mathe-
matical biology. Afterward, I argued that contemporary sys-
tems biology rested on the convergence between systems of
molecular biology and systems mathematical biology. The
above mentioned convergence enabled application of systems
approach to science, medicine, and biotechnology. Only after
the completion of all historical steps, the modern systems biol-
ogy was born. Then, it will be examined the impact of systems
biology on longstanding philosophical and scientific concep-
tions of reductionism, antireductionism and emergence.
2. The birth of systems biology: molecular biology, general
systems theory, and nonlinear dynamics
What are the differences between molecular biologist and sys-
tems biologist view on biological systems? Ahn and colleagueshave made some of the crucial distinction between reductionist
and system-oriented view on the biology (Ahn et al., 2006).
When it comes to the underlying principles, the two
approaches differ in understanding how biological systems
behave. In reductionist view, the behavior of biological sys-
tems can be explained by the properties of components. The
system oriented approach insisted that biological systems have
emergent properties that only can have a system as a whole
and not its constituent parts. The metaphors used by these
two approaches are quite different: machine/magic bullet ver-
sus network. Considering the approach, reductionism gives
explanatory significance only to one factor, while the system
biology considers a number of factors in order to describe
the behavior of dynamic system. In reductionist approach
the critical factors are directly determining while in the system
view it depends on time, space and context. According to
reductionist approach, the characteristics of models that
explain the behavior of the system are linearity, predictability
and determinism. Contrastingly, the systems approach insists
on nonlinearity, sensitivity to initial conditions, stochasticity
(probabilism) and chaotic behavior. Systems-oriented over-
view of the concept of health in medicine implies robustness,
adaptability/plasticity and homeodynamic (dynamic under-
stood homeostasis). The reductionist approach emphasized
the normalcy, reducing exposure to risk and static homeosta-
sis. Obviously reductionist and systems view on biology are
quite different. When and how does this Copernican revolu-
tion in biology happen?
From the early days, molecular biology treated the compo-
nents of a cell as static and isolated, neglecting the dynamical
interaction between them. But, the methodological aspect of
reductionist approaches had a good side. After all, this
approach influenced the development of so many diverse
molecular techniques. Without them scientists would not be
able to identify genes, molecules and processes, and surely
human genome project would have never happened. Hence,
the systems molecular biology would not exist. The negative
side of reductionist molecular approach referred to lack of
holistic and integrative knowledge of biological processes. As
molecular biologists acquire vast number of facts about
DNA, RNA and proteins, it becomes more difficult to give
explanation of what organism is. Thus, how to connect molec-
ular processes with higher level biological phenomena becomes
the issue. Therefore, instead of concentrating on the physio-
chemical and biological properties of single or limited number
of molecules, the priority has become to find out how the
molecular networks assembled and function. Finally, the com-
pletion of human genome project directed molecular biology
toward systems molecular biology. By developing the systems
molecular biology, molecular biologist made the first step
toward contemporary systems biology.
During the second half of 20th century systems mathemat-
ical biology existed in parallel with molecular biology. The
term systems biology was introduced by Mihajlo Mesarovic
in 1968 (Mesarovic, 1968; Mesarovic et al., 2004), but there
are opinions that the term may be introduced in the 1920s
by Ludwig von Bertalanffy, the father of general systems the-
ory (Drack, 2007). However, Mesarovic applied general sys-
tems theory in order to discover how biological objects
relate, rather than what they are composed of (Mesarovic,
1968; Mesarovic et al., 2004). Before the pioneering work of
Mihajlo Mesarovic, general systems theory was developed by
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called a ‘‘system theory of life’’ contributing to the develop-
ment of theoretical biology (Drack, 2009). His theory was an
attempt to scientifically study the organism as ‘‘wholeness’’.
Unsatisfied by mechanists and vitalist doctrine that implies
metaphysics, Bertalanffy found the solution in the mathemat-
ical modeling of biological organism (Drack, 2009). General
systems theory that he developed, concentrated on the topics
such as self-regulating systems, i.e. systems self-correcting
through feedback, the concepts widely used in physiology
and engineering science. Since it was introduced, general sys-
tems theory was successful in modeling the biochemical reac-
tion networks, homeostasis, neural, immune, cardio and
endocrine system function (Ederer et al., 2003). GSS theory
found its important place in modern systems neurobiology as
a part of neural networks research and modeling.
Application of general systems theory in biology was the first
step in formation of systems mathematical biology. The next
step was the development and application of nonlinear
dynamics.
Chaos theory is mathematical theory that yet has not been
fully developed (Oestreicher, 2007). The beginning of chaos
theory dates back to Henry Poincare and his studies of sensi-
tivity to initial conditions of physical systems (Oestreicher,
2007). The important contributions to chaos theory gave
Andrei Kolmogorov with the work on statistics of dynamical
systems (Oestreicher, 2007). Another contribution to chaos
theory comes from the work of Edward Lorenz, David
Ruelle and many others researchers in the field (Oestreicher,
2007). A major advance in the development of nonlinear
dynamics has been the introduction of the concepts of fractals
by Benoit Mandelbrot in 1973. What are fractals? Simple pro-
cess that is repeated endlessly becomes a very complex process,
and this fact is the basis for the description of fractals in nature
(Naik et al., 2011). Fractal is a shape that retains its structural
detail despite scaling and this is the reason why complex object
could be described by a single number: the fractal dimension
(FD) (Arle and Simon, 1990). The next big step in nonlinear
theory development was introduction of Higuchi fractal
dimension (HFD) (Higuchi, 1988). The simplest definition of
fractal dimension is: FD represents nonlinear measure of the
complexity in time domain. After HFD was introduced, few
other methods for FD calculation have been developed, but
HFD provides the most accurate estimate of the FD
(Esteller et al., 2001).
How nonlinear dynamics relates to systems mathematical
biology? As mentioned, systemic view on biology includes non-
linearity, sensitivity to initial conditions, stochasticity (proba-
bilism) and chaotic behavior (Ahn et al., 2006). These
concepts come from the hearth of nonlinear dynamics.
Nonlinear dynamics is the theory of nonlinear systems and pro-
cesses (Klonowski, 2007). Linearity and nonlinearity, in math-
ematics, can be defined in the context of relations between cause
and effect (linear and nonlinear causality) (Scott, 2002).
Linearity implies the existence of proportionality or additivity.
It means that system responds proportionately to the applied
input (Higgins, 2002). Nonlinearity of the system, physical or
biological, means that the properties of the constituent compo-
nents are different than the properties of the system itself
(Higgins, 2002). Nonlinear systems are characterized by
deterministic (dynamic) chaoticity (Stam, 2005). Biological
systems and processes are inherently complex, nonlinear andnonstationary (Paraschiv-Ionescu and Aminian, 2009). The
behavior of nonlinear systems depends on the initial conditions
and that is the reason why it is difficult to predict their behavior
(Stam, 2005). The stochastic (random) behavior of nonlinear
systems is ostensible, because their characteristics can be pre-
dicted in the short time series (Leith, 1996). In the long term,
nonlinear systems are characterized by unpredictability as a
consequence of sensitivity to initial conditions (Leith, 1996).
Biological processes characterize time variability (nonsta-
tionarity). Nonstationarity is the result of the interaction of
internal and external factors and regulatory processes that
maintain homeostasis of the organism (Eke et al., 2002). The
nonlinear behavior, besides being characteristic of complex
wholeness (cell, brain), also could be found in different subsys-
tems of the cell. Thus, membrane potentials, spontaneous bio-
electric activity of neurons, and ionic currents caused by
movement of ions through the ion channels are also chaotic
processes (Liebovitch and Todorov, 1996; Abarbanel et al.,
1996; Schu¨tt et al., 2002). Therefore, all levels of central ner-
vous systems organization, from molecules to the brain, shows
nonlinear behavior.
Successful application of nonlinear dynamics in analysis of
biological hierarchies finished the formation of systems math-
ematical biology. The stage was set for convergence of systems
molecular and systems mathematical biology. Conceptually,
convergence took place when nonlinear dynamics and general
systems theory was introduced for gene, protein and metabolic
networks analyses. This was the moment when the systems
molecular biology and systems mathematical biology con-
verge, in the second step of systems biology development.
Therefore, nonlinear modeling of gene regulatory networks,
from time series gene expression data is one of the most diffi-
cult problems in systems biology (Hasty et al., 2001; Mazur
et al., 2009; Meister et al., 2013). Biological structure and func-
tion depends on regulatory interactions between many genes
(Meister et al., 2013). Description of gene regulatory network
interference depends on efficient nonlinear models of vast
number of genome-wide measurements.
Finally, after successful application in science research,
medicine and biotechnology, systems biology was completely
shaped. Thus, understanding the origin of neurodegenerative,
cancer, inflammatory and genetic diseases is only possible by
systems biological holistic approach. Identification of differ-
ences between cancerous and healthy cell is difficult because
of many different molecules from parallel signal transduction
pathways (Hornberg et al., 2006). Systems biology quantifica-
tion and modeling of regulatory circuits, nonlinear reaction
kinetics of biochemical processes and cross-talk between path-
ways determine the site at which oncologist should intervene
(Hornberg et al., 2006). Similarly, the complex mechanism of
neurodegenerative disease could only be deciphered by systems
biology approach (Noorbakhsh et al., 2009). Surely, there are
so many examples of successful application of contemporary
systems biology that there is no enough space to mention all
of them (Fig. 1).
3. Reductionism and antireductionism in the era of systems
biology
The appearances of molecular biology in the early 50s of the
20th century marked a major milestone in efforts to connect
biology with the chemical and physical sciences. Scientists
Figure 1 Schematic diagram that represents the three phases of contemporary systems biology development.
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be a bridge between biology and physics. Hence, if it was pos-
sible to reduce biological phenomena on corresponding molec-
ular structures and processes, then the process of reduction on
physics will be almost completed (Rosenberg, 1985). This
reductionist reasoning was a part of larger logical-positivist
project of science unification under the auspices of physics
(Faye, 2014). From such a perspective, it was inevitable that
reductionism as one of the key problems of philosophy of
science poured on theoretical and practical field of biology.
What is reduction and reductionism in biology? The basic
assumption underlying reduction is the possibility to prove
that certain things are nothing more than another type of
things. John Searle stated that this claim can simply be
expressed by using the relation of identity, which could be
called ‘‘nothing-but’’ (Searle, 1992). One of the essential
classifications of reductionism, applied to the problems of liv-
ing world, was introduced by the famous geneticist and evolu-
tionary biologist Francis Ayala (Ayala, 1974). He made a
distinction between the ontological, epistemological and
methodological reductionism in biology. Ontological reduction-
ism stated that physical–chemical entities and processes are
essentially same for inanimate nature and living organisms.
The difference between organic life and inanimate matter can
only be explained by the specific organization of living systems.
In the case of epistemological reductionism, laws, generaliza-
tions, explanations and theories of biology could be ultimately
reduced, by certain formal rules, to more general and funda-
mental laws and theories of physics. Methodological reduction-
ism is related to the acceptance of certain scientific-research
strategies. In biology methodological reductionism are related
to the implementation for example molecular, cellular or sys-
temic approach to research.
The ultimate pretension of reductionist is to prove that an
assumption of ontological reductionism is true. But to defend
this view one must accept certain metaphysical position, par-
ticularly one form of substantial monism called materialistic
monism. First mention of substantial monism could be found
in presocratic philosophy and later in the works of Spinoza
and Hegel. There are various forms of monism and the most
basic classification is on idealistic and materialistic monism.
Idealistic monism is the view that the basis of reality is mindor spirit. On the other hand materialist monism assumes that
only physical reality exists. In contemporary philosophy of
mind frequently mentioned position is materialistic monism
(physicalism), the view according to which the only reality is
physical and all mental phenomena could be reduced to the
physical (Crane, 2000). If ontological reductionism exceeded
the domain of scientific thinking, the next line of reductionist
defense will be the acceptance of epistemological reductionism.
But as we are going to see epistemological reductionism is also a
fertile ground for the supporters of antireductionism.
What is epistemological reductionism and antireductionism?
The most detailed classification of epistemological reductionism
and antireductionism in genetics and biology was presented by
the Russell Vance. His classification was based on those made
by Philip Kitcher in 1984 (Vance, 1996). According to Vance
and Kitcher strong (eliminative) reductionism, admits the exis-
tence of independent, but not autonomous levels of explana-
tion in biology except in molecular biology. Therefore, the
explanation of biological phenomena can always find an ade-
quate explanation of molecular biology and, ultimately, phy-
sics. In contrast to the strong, weak reductionism recognizes
the existence of autonomous levels of explanation, but their
relationship is asymmetrical, thus reserving the possibility of
reducing genetics and whole biology to molecular biology
(Vance, 1996).
Besides the reductionist, Vance mentioned the following
antireductionist positions: strong, weak and heroic antireduc-
tionism. Strong antireductionism admitted the existence of
autonomous levels of explanation in biology, and the relation-
ship between the levels are necessarily symmetric and neither
level of explanation is privileged. Weak antireductionism pro-
posed, that in addition to the autonomy of levels, the relation-
ship between the levels, not necessarily, could be symmetrical.
Vance opposite to Kitcher stands out for heroic antireduc-
tionism, a position which is actualized in the era of systems
biology. Heroic antireductionism stated that there are no inde-
pendent levels of explanation and that reducing and reduced
theories should be considered as complementary components
of a unified whole. Heroic antireductionism supposed to defend
the view that molecular and Mendelian genetics are fundamen-
tally united with the help of two central practices of modern
genetics, cloning and the human genome project (Vance, 1996).
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tionism was a widely accepted view. For molecular biologist,
only correct and meaningful approach to the study of life pro-
cesses was those based on experiments and techniques ofFigure 2 The proposed hierarchy established between the three
types of antireductionism. Heroic methodological antireduction-
ism is directly supported by the practice of systems biology. Only
after that, epistemological and ontological antireductionisms are
supported.molecular biology. Molecular paradigm was supposed to be
the foundation for all other subfields of biology. Therefore,
physiology, ecology and genetics should be transformed into
molecular physiology, molecular genetics and molecular ecol-
ogy. After the development of systems biology and systems
approach, molecular research has become an integral part of
systems paradigm. I would say that there was no shifting
between molecular and systems paradigm. In post-genomic
era the molecular research have continued to take place.
Today, it is the starting point for systems biology research.
The best is to describe situation as research integration.
Good example of research integration could be found in scien-
tific endeavor to define gene. In pre-genomic era, gene was
defined as a linear sequence of DNK that provides instructions
for hereditary character. But, post-genomic definition of gene
is far more complex and besides different segments of genomes
(DNA and RNA), includes protein molecules. Even, in order
to define gene additional information on the initial conditions
(initial state interaction within the network) should be pro-
vided (Noble, 2010). These conditions only could be specified
by applied nonlinear dynamic measures, an important part
of systems-mathematical biology (Noble, 2010). In addition,
gene could be understood only after the functional interpreta-
tion of the relationship of genotype and phenotype was done
(Noble, 2010). This was only possible to achieve, if Mendel’s
classic conception of the gene, which is used in population
and evolutionary genetics, was accepted (Stotz, 2004;
Griffiths and Stotz, 2006). The research practice in an era of
systems biology includes both molecular and Mendelian
approach, thus uniting molecular and classical Mendelian
genetics.
At this point I would like to introduce the term heroic
methodological antireductionism. The heroic methodological
antireductionism could be defended by the contemporary sys-
tems biology. It is feasible considering the capacity of systems
biology to unify the practice of genetics and molecular biology
with mathematical and computational approaches. Vance
heroic antireductionism is wrongly called epistemological
because it was based on methodological approach. The more
appropriate term should be heroic methodological antireduc-
tionism. If the objective of heroic antireductionism is to provide
an explanation that reducing and reduced theories are comple-
mentary, then practice is not an appropriate way to achieve
that. The search for explanation is in the domain of epistemol-
ogy. The practice of contemporary systems biology first
implies heroic methodological antireductionism.
Epistemological consequence can be implemented only after
methodological consideration. Therefore, systems biology
implies the hierarchy of antireductionist position. The most
directly supported is heroic methodological antireductionism,
and only then, one can consider epistemological antireduction-
ism. At the end of hierarchy is ontological antireductionism,
that can be introduced only if it possible to defend the specific
ontology implied by systems biology. Whatever the type of
antireductionism is accepted, the independence of biology
from physics, could be defended (Fig. 2).
4. Emergence: a systems biology view
How does systems biology influence scientific and philosophi-
cal debate about emergence? Do concepts of emergence rein-
force antireductionism in the era of systems biology? The
Systems biology and antireductionism 589basic assumption of emergence is that the natural world is
organized hierarchically from the level of subatomic
particles to the ecosystem, biosphere etc. (Mazzochi, 2008).
Each of the proposed hierarchical level has certain emergent
principles that do not appear in the lower level of the organi-
zation, and therefore it would be impossible to explain the
functioning of a biological organism using only physicochem-
ical principles.
Silberstein and McGeever (1999), distinguishes between
two types of emergence, ontological and epistemological emer-
gence. Ontological emergence refers to the properties of the sys-
tem or a whole, having ‘‘causal capacities’’ irreducible to the
intrinsic ‘‘causal capacity’’ of the system parts (Silberstein
and McGeever, 1999). Ontological emergence is often present
in the philosophy of mind and psychology debates. Today,
the most actual view on emergence is emergent materialism,
especially its sub-branches called as emergent property dualism
(Gulick, 2001). Property dualist theories accept physical sub-
stance, but assert two different kinds of properties, mental
and physical (Gulick, 2001). Mental properties supervene on
lower levels constituted by fundamental physical principles.
Specific organization of material substance is the cause of
‘‘emergence’’ of novel properties. The most puzzling question
is how mental properties ‘‘emerge’’ from more fundamental
levels. Well, we will not discuss that issue, but certainly emer-
gence is poorly understood and it is one of the central prob-
lems in modern philosophy and science.
Another important issue is ontological emergence connec-
tions with vitalism. When vitalism was rejected as non-
scientific, the only reasonable aspect of vitalism that survives
was concept of emergence (Emmeche et al., 1997). Unlike
vitalism, emergence postulates that the creation of new
properties is invariant to the substance involved (Emmeche
et al., 1997). Therefore, emergence is often defined as an
ontological middle course, between monist materialist and
dualist ontologies (Bitbol, 2007). Besides biology, this concept
could be applied to inanimate world. But it is necessary to
address differences between emergence and vitalism. In the
heart of vitalism is assumption of substantial dualism. Vitalist
believed that all living organism are driven by inexplicable
‘‘vital forces’’. ‘‘Vital forces’’ could not be described by means
of physical chemistry or any other scientific approach. The
essence of life is immaterial and this is the reason why biology
is quite different than physical sciences of non-living world.
As not being scientific concept, vitalism could not have a
significant role in scientific-based antireductionist thinking.
Maybe it could find its place in metaphysical and history of
philosophy discussions. Contrastingly to the vitalist worldview,
emergent property dualist accepted the view that the world is
only made by physical substance.
How can systems biology support for example emergent
property dualism? The question is quite practical and it is based
on the hypothesis that functioning of organism as a whole
could be understood after discovering all possible interactions
between constitutive elements of organism. Then, the aim of
systems biology would not be the only quantification of inter-
action between molecules, but also to predict and describe
(quantitatively and qualitatively) emergent properties on the
higher level. Before that step systems biologist should recog-
nize when structural and functional unity of constitutive parts
produce something novel and quite different. In that casesystems biology methods would allow predictions of emergent
properties with high accuracy. Still, we are not able to recog-
nize when and how the vast number of molecular networks
produce highly organized and functional single cell, not to
mention the whole human organism. However, if ontological
emergence is true, then it would be possible to defend strong
antireductionism. Looking from a today’s scientific perspective
the best way to argue in favor of antireductionism is by accept-
ing the epistemological emergence.
Epistemological emergence occurs in situations when we do
not have satisfactory explanation of the higher-level phenom-
ena by those that exist at a lower level (Silberstein and
McGeever, 1999). These problems are the result of deficiencies
in our cognitive powers but also in the methodological limita-
tions of science. Epistemological emergence includes any expla-
nation of the higher hierarchical levels with the help of
modeling or some functional explanation (Silberstein and
McGeever, 1999). Hence, accepting the systems biology as
powerful methodological tool, researchers can overcome the
limitations of empirical research. But still the question is
how to compensate deficiencies of our cognitive powers?
Systems biology studies often include large sets of data. For
the purpose of analysis, researchers and mathematicians devel-
oped complex algorithms. However, to comprehend and con-
nect all data in one coherent and functional whole, science
must rely on human cognitive powers. For example, in order
to find out how drugs mutually interact, a metric ‘‘S-score’’
that measures the strength of network connection between
drug targets was developed (Huang et al., 2013). This algo-
rithm is robust and based on Bayesian probabilistic model,
thus achieving certain degree of accuracy. Similarly this situa-
tion is with other complex algorithms for drug design. To pre-
dict interactions between different molecules that constitute
the networks of biochemical interactions scientists developed
ClustRNet algorithm based on a Markov chain (Bansal
et al., 2009). Considering that biological system contains huge
number of components, interactions and variables, it becomes
clear how difficult disentangling the various network proper-
ties can be. These findings suggest that systems biology solu-
tion to epistemological emergence is partial. The problem of
limited capacity of human species to develop research hard-
ware or software, and to acquire complete and meaningful
explanation of how molecules give rise to organism, probably
will be unresolved. The question is how epistemological emer-
gence can support antireductionism?
Epistemological emergence goes hand to hand with weak
antireductionism proposed by Kitcher and Vance. Accepting
epistemological emergence antireductionist can argue in favor
of autonomy of levels only relying on the current state of
knowledge. The reason is that systems biology is in its early
phase of development, and generally science method has its
limitation especially in understanding the life phenomena.
Reductionist could argue that epistemic and methodological
shortcomings, which are temporary, would be overcome by
future developments of systems biology. Also one could theo-
rize that the problem of limited human cognitive powers can be
solved by cognitive enhancement or even evolution of human
brain. In such a perspective, antireductionist would not be able
to count on epistemological emergence. Then, the only solution
for them will be to reconsider ontological emergence as poten-
tial source of argument.
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The present paper examines the necessary historical steps that
shaped contemporary systems biology. First I have agreed
with Westerhoff and Palsson (2004) account about the first his-
torical root of systems biology. My objection to their account
is that they did not use the term systems molecular biology,
independently from systems biology. I proposed the use of
term systems molecular biology as justified, especially when
we talk about the interaction of molecular pathways or molec-
ular networks, without the use of mathematical modeling.
Systems molecular biology should be distinguished from
O’Malley and Dupre´ understanding of pragmatic systems biol-
ogy, where mathematical models have an important role.
Systems molecular biology dates back to the era of beginning
of molecular biology with subsequent discoveries that led to
the completion of human genome project. Unlike Westerhoff
and Palsson (2004), I have argued that the second phase of sys-
tems biology development included two roots. The first root
dates back to the development of general systems theory and
the second were related to the emergence of nonlinear dynam-
ics. The convergence of general systems theory and nonlinear
dynamics has enabled the appearance of systems mathematical
biology. I used the term systems mathematical biology instead
of systems-theoretical biology, because the word theoretical
besides mathematical could have philosophical implications.
Since systems biology is closely related to methodology, prac-
tice was the only correct way to prove its advantage over
molecular reductionist approach. Hence, I proposed that suc-
cessful application of systems biology in science, medicine
and biotechnology was the final phase that shaped contempo-
rary systems biology.
In the postgenomic era molecular approach still exists as an
integral part of systems biology approach. As being a part of
systems molecular biology, molecular approach provides nec-
essary data that can be used for detailed systems analysis of
organism. I have already discussed the unification of molecular
and systems paradigm by presenting the postgenomic concept
of gene. In addition, it can be concluded that systems biology
integrates all existing biological, mathematical, computational
and medical knowledge. Systems biology does not represent
the revolution in the sense of Kuhnian paradigm shift. It is
more of an integrative endeavor, where much of the biological
and other sciences are accepted. Hence, systems biology may
serve as a good example for other sciences, such as physics,
where the problem of scientific revolution is omnipresent.
Instead of changing the existing, the best way may be integra-
tion of old and new paradigm, thus ensuring the progress of
science.
Discussion of Ayala’s (1974) concept of methodological
reductionism and critic of Vance (1996) heroic antireductionism
was necessary before I introduced the term heroic methodolog-
ical antireductionism. This type of antireductionism anticipates
practice of systems biology. Perhaps, it is the most convenient
antireductionist position supported by systems biology.
However, at least the weak epistemological antireductionism
could be supported by systems biology. But, systems biology
is a more research strategy than the subfield of biology, so it
is logical to assume its support to methodological antireduction-
ism. The best way to argue in favor of antireductionism is by
accepting the ontological emergence. If one could argue infavor of ontological emergence, then strong antireductionism
will be guaranteed. In order to defend variants of ontological
emergence such as emergent property dualism, systems biology
should transcend its current limitations. But in that case, sys-
tems biology should be capable to recognize when new emer-
gent properties arise from molecular networks interaction.
The transcendence of scientific domain is generally an problem
of ontological emergence. Ontological emergence implies unli-
kely ontology which is why it is very difficult to defend it
(Heard, 2006). Although, strengthened by the success of sys-
tems biology, epistemological emergence could not yet provide
irrefutable antireductionist argumentation. The reason for that
could be found in actual state of knowledge and lack of human
cognitive powers. The systems biology is completed as a con-
ceptual approach, but advancement in methods and successful
application is far from over. The further development may
allow humans to find out how all biological hierarchies func-
tion. But to do that, besides scientific and technological pro-
gress, in order to comprehend all facts, the higher capacity
of human mind will be necessary. Systems biology is the field
of inexhaustible questions. This paper asks some big historical
and philosophical questions and gives modest solutions.
Discussion on the subject is only open and scientist and
philosophers worldwide should be involved in open-minded
dialog.
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